Information design in cheap talk

Arbeitspapier

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender's optimal experiment, and give sufficient conditions for information design to be valuable or not under different payoff structures. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives-how payoffs vary with the state-than on the alignment of sender's and receiver's rankings over actions within a state.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 199

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: marginal incentives ; common interest ; concave envelope ; quasiconcave envelope ; double randomization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lyu, Qianjun ; Suen, Wing-chuen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (where): Bonn and Cologne
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/268032
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET