Artikel
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium which fully reveals the state (a FRE), there exists a robust FRE, i.e. one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, relating the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver, the Min Rule, that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1203-1235 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
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Cheap talk
information transmission
multisender
full revelation
robustness
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Meyer, Margaret A.
Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Nafziger, Julia
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2597
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Meyer, Margaret A.
- Moreno de Barreda, Inés
- Nafziger, Julia
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2019
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