The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1432-1270
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent ; day:19 ; month:4 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-15
International journal of game theory ; (19.4.2021), 1-15
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021060613061709989289
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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14.08.2025, 11:03 AM CEST
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Associated
- Diehl, Christoph
- Kuzmics, Christoph
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Objects (12)
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
Funkabhörberichte feindlicher Sender: Sender Vatikan
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
Funkabhörberichte feindlicher Sender: Sender Vatikan
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games