The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1432-1270
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent ; day:19 ; month:4 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-15
International journal of game theory ; (19.4.2021), 1-15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021060613061709989289
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 11:03 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Diehl, Christoph
- Kuzmics, Christoph
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
Funkabhörberichte feindlicher Sender: Sender Vatikan
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
Funkabhörberichte feindlicher Sender: Sender Vatikan
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
"Concordia" - Sender: Einzelne Sender
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games