Backwards integration and strategic delegation

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the effects of downstream firms' acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when all firms compete in prices. With an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales. Double marginalization is enhanced. Whereas full vertical integration would lead to decreasing, passive backwards ownership leads to increasing downstream prices and is more profitable, as long as competition is sufficiently intensive. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, inducing the efficient supplier to commit to high prices. All results are sustained when upstream suppliers are allowed to charge two part tariffs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 12-022

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Thema: double marginalization ; strategic delegation ; vertical integration ; partial ownership ; common agency ; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung ; Vertikale Konzentration ; Kapitalbeteiligung ; Übernahme ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Betriebliche Preispolitik ; Preiswettbewerb ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hunold, Matthias ; Röller, Lars-Hendrik ; Stahl, Konrad
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56060
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-322041
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ