Arbeitspapier
Strategic Delegation under Cost Asymmetry
We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set. Allowing for a continuous set of delegation incentives, we prove that the delegation stage is a prisoners dilemma, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium entailing both firms hiring managers. At equilibrium, the more efficient firm makes higher profits.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1016
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Marattin, Luigi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4309
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Delbono, Flavio
- Lambertini, Luca
- Marattin, Luigi
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2015
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Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Process R&D in Monopoly under Demand Uncertainty
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Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Market integration, the Specialization of Production and Labour Mobility Under Endogenous Differentiation
A Cost-side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability
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