Arbeitspapier
Delegation and Product Differentiation
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 173
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
1993
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5184
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1993
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Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation
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Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
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Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
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