Arbeitspapier
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
This paper proposes a taxonomy of the Stackelberg equilibria emerging from a standard game of horizontal differentiation à la Hotelling in which the strategy set of the sellers in the location stage is the real axis. Repeated leadership appears the most advantageous position. Furthermore, this endogenously yields vertical differentiation between products at equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 161
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1993
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5196
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1993
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Oligopoly à la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Trade Liberalization May Be Harmful under Endogenous Differentiation
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Oligopoly à la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Trade Liberalization May Be Harmful under Endogenous Differentiation
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Oligopoly à la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion