Arbeitspapier
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
This paper proposes a taxonomy of the Stackelberg equilibria emerging from a standard game of horizontal differentiation à la Hotelling in which the strategy set of the sellers in the location stage is the real axis. Repeated leadership appears the most advantageous position. Furthermore, this endogenously yields vertical differentiation between products at equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 161
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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1993
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5196
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1993
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Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Oligopoly à la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Delegation and Product Differentiation
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Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Trade Liberalization May Be Harmful under Endogenous Differentiation
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Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Dynamic Oligopoly à la Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
Intraindustry Trade Under Vertical Product Differentiation
Vertical Product Differentiation; Some More General Results
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion