Arbeitspapier
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
In this paper, we show that, contrarily to the conclusions obtained by Cremer and Thisse (1991), the equilibrium emerging from a model of vertical product differentiation does not yield maximum differentiation because of the strtegic complementarity between products in the quality space.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 164
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1993
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5193
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1993
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