Arbeitspapier

Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation

We describe a vertically di¤erentiated market where firms choose between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, firms either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave collusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a parameter region where the joint venture makes it more difficult for firms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ventures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 385

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lambertini, Luca
Iori, Cristina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2000

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4924
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Iori, Cristina
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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