Arbeitspapier
Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation
We describe a vertically di¤erentiated market where firms choose between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, firms either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave collusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a parameter region where the joint venture makes it more difficult for firms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ventures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 385
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Iori, Cristina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2000
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4924
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Iori, Cristina
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2000