Arbeitspapier
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 211
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1994
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5115
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1994
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