Arbeitspapier
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
The issue of a cartel stability is investigated in a vertical differentiation framework with convex variable production costs. The behaviour of firms' critical discount factors as the curvature of the cost function varies is analysed, considering either the noncooperative or cooperative qualities, and either price or quantity behaviour. It emerges that, if firms aim at stabilizing the cartel, they are better off paying à la Counot and prefer not to choose the monopoly qualities.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 259
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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1996
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5051
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1996
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Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Bertrand versus Cournot with Convex Variable Costs
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand