Arbeitspapier
Bertrand versus Cournot with Convex Variable Costs
Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profits (welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot-Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 994
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
-
Bologna
- (when)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4168
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Delbono, Flavio
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2015
Other Objects (12)
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Dynamic Hotelling Duopoly with Linear Transportation Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Dynamic Hotelling Duopoly with Linear Transportation Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms
Dynamic Hotelling Duopoly with Linear Transportation Costs
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand
Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly