Arbeitspapier
The Environmental Impact of Bertrand and Cournot Duopolies. A Cautionary Note
We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output determines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative environmental effects of production more than offset the gain in consumer surplus.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 812
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
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Bologna
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4206
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tampieri, Alessandro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2012