Arbeitspapier

Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation

We consider a nynamic oligopoly where firms invest to increase product differentiation and an externality effect operates in the R&D activity. We compare the steady state solutions under alternative decision rules, namely, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Significant differences emerge, concerning the effect of the number of firms upon the optimal degree o product differentiation. We also compare the privat optima with the social optimum, and derive implications concerning the social diserability of different decision rules.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 431

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2002

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4867
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Cellini, Roberto
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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