Arbeitspapier
Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation
We consider a nynamic oligopoly where firms invest to increase product differentiation and an externality effect operates in the R&D activity. We compare the steady state solutions under alternative decision rules, namely, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Significant differences emerge, concerning the effect of the number of firms upon the optimal degree o product differentiation. We also compare the privat optima with the social optimum, and derive implications concerning the social diserability of different decision rules.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 431
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2002
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4867
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Cellini, Roberto
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2002