Arbeitspapier
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Which shape market competition is likely to exhibit? This question is addressed in the present paper, where firms can choose whether to act as quantity or price setters, whether to move early or delay as long as possible at the market stage and finally whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial. Moreover, firms can endogenously determine the sequence of such decisions. It is shown that in correspondence of the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all firms first decide to delay, then to act as Cournot competitors, and finally stockholders decide to delegate control to managers. Hence, sequential play between either managerial or entrepreneurial firms, as well as simultaneous play between entrepreneurial firms are ruled out.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 267
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1996
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5043
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1996
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On price competition with market share delegation contracts
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Strategic Delegation under Cost Asymmetry
Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
Investigating the Strategic Nature of Supply Functions in Oligopoly
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Advertising in a Differential Game of Spatial Competition
Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On price competition with market share delegation contracts
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Strategic Delegation under Cost Asymmetry
Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
Investigating the Strategic Nature of Supply Functions in Oligopoly
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Advertising in a Differential Game of Spatial Competition
Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On price competition with market share delegation contracts
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Delegation and Product Differentiation
Strategic Delegation under Cost Asymmetry
Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
Investigating the Strategic Nature of Supply Functions in Oligopoly
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Advertising in a Differential Game of Spatial Competition