Arbeitspapier
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the subgame perfect equilibrium when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. There exists a unique value of the slope at which best replies are orthogonal and the choice between simultaneous and sequential play is immaterial.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1069
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5173
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Delbono, Flavio
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2016
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