Arbeitspapier
Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 290
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Strategic delegation
managerial incentives
experimental economics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Müller, Wieland
Norman, Hans-Theo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Müller, Wieland
- Norman, Hans-Theo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000
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