Strategic delegation and voting rules

Arbeitspapier

When making collektive desicions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be conservative (status quo biased) or instead progressive relative to his principal. I show how the answer depends on the political system in general, and the majority requirement in particular. A larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation, but sincere delegation is always achieved by the optimal voting rule.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1442

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Thema: Strategic delegation ; collective decisions ; voting rules ; Abstimmungsregel ; Public Choice ; Wahlverhalten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Harstad, Bård
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31228
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ