Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination

Arbeitspapier

In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IES Working Paper ; No. 11/2015

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: arrow's theorem ; dictatorship ; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ; manipulation ; Pareto efficiency ; strategic voting ; strategic nomination

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Turnovec, František
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
• (where): Prague
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120441
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET