Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

"Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Strategisches Koalitionswählen: Befunde aus Österreich
• Extent: Seite(n): 339-349
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Electoral Studies, 29(3)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Politikwissenschaft ; politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur ; Österreich ; Wahlverhalten ; Wahlergebnis ; Koalitionspolitik ; Koalitionsbildung ; Strategie ; Wahl ; Regierungspartei ; Entscheidung ; Regierungsbildung ; Präferenz ; Einfluss ; Parteianhänger ; Koalition ; empirisch ; empirisch-quantitativ ; deskriptive Studie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Niederlande
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257796
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST