Arbeitspapier
Optimal Voting Rules
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 417
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gershkov, Alex
Moldovanu, Benny
Shi, Xianwen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
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2013
- DOI
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doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17242
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17242-4
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gershkov, Alex
- Moldovanu, Benny
- Shi, Xianwen
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2013
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