Arbeitspapier
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 185
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Committee decisions
Scoring rules
"Almost" voting rules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baharad, Eyal
Danziger, Leif
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
- (wo)
-
Maastricht
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baharad, Eyal
- Danziger, Leif
- Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Entstanden
- 2018
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