Arbeitspapier
Voting in small committees
A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the optimal committee composition. We show that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, heterogeneous committees perform at least as well as homogeneous committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique. Finally, allowing members to communicate brings no improvement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3732
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
voting
small committees
committees composition
communication in committees
Gruppenentscheidung
Wahlverhalten
Kommunikation
Präferenztheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Balduzzi, Paolo
Graziano, Clara
Luporini, Annalisa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Balduzzi, Paolo
- Graziano, Clara
- Luporini, Annalisa
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2012
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