Arbeitspapier
When is Voting Optimal?
We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds light on the relationship between the optimal decision rule and voting mechanisms. The paper derives the conditions under which the optimal decision rule is equivalent to some well-known voting procedure (weighted supermajority, weighted majority, and simple majority) and shows that these are very stringent. The paper also considers more general voting procedures, as for example allowing for abstentions, and shows that the conditions for reaching the optimal collective choice remain very stringent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5116
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
voting rule
common goal
collective choice
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ben-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth
- Danziger, Leif
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
When Is Voting Optimal?
Optimal Voting Rules
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Optimal fiscal policy when migration is feasible
Voting When the Stakes Are High
Voting when the stakes are high
Optimal Growth when Environmental Quality is a Research Asset
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design
Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
When Is Voting Optimal?
Optimal Voting Rules
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Optimal fiscal policy when migration is feasible
Voting When the Stakes Are High
Voting when the stakes are high
Optimal Growth when Environmental Quality is a Research Asset
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design
Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
When Is Voting Optimal?
Optimal Voting Rules
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Optimal fiscal policy when migration is feasible
Voting When the Stakes Are High
Voting when the stakes are high
Optimal Growth when Environmental Quality is a Research Asset
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design
When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design