Arbeitspapier
Voting when the stakes are high
Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3167
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- Thema
-
voter motivation
elections
turnout
Wahlverhalten
Rationales Verhalten
Steuerpolitik
Wahl
Norwegen
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersen, Jørgen Juel
Fiva, Jon H.
Natvik, Gisle James
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersen, Jørgen Juel
- Fiva, Jon H.
- Natvik, Gisle James
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010