Arbeitspapier

Voting when the stakes are high

Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3167

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Thema
voter motivation
elections
turnout
Wahlverhalten
Rationales Verhalten
Steuerpolitik
Wahl
Norwegen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andersen, Jørgen Juel
Fiva, Jon H.
Natvik, Gisle James
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andersen, Jørgen Juel
  • Fiva, Jon H.
  • Natvik, Gisle James
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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