Arbeitspapier
Delegation and Strategic Compensation in Tournaments
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2000
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2000
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