Dynamically sabotage-proof tournaments

Arbeitspapier

This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these two schemes arise in a unified framework.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 838

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Labor Contracts ; Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
• Thema: Sabotage ; Tournament ; Fast track ; Late selection ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Anreizvertrag ; Arbeitsethik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ishida, Junichiro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92703
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ