Arbeitspapier

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 266

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
dynamic tournaments
contests
sabotage
heterogeneity
Extensives Spiel
Arbeitsverhalten
Leistungsmotivation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gürtler, Oliver
Münster, Johannes
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2009

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13286
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13286-7
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gürtler, Oliver
  • Münster, Johannes
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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