Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment

Arbeitspapier

Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare-reducing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2012-01

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Field Experiments ; Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: tournaments ; sabotage ; Judo ; natural experiment ; Extensives Spiel ; Feldforschung ; Sport

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Balafoutas, Loukas ; Lindner, Florian ; Sutter, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73485
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET