Arbeitspapier
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive dealership) contract with its retailer. Equilibrium coexistence emerges when observable and non-renegotiable contracts are offered to downstream Cournot oligopolists that supply close substitutes. The scope for equilibrium coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 00-16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Thema
-
vertical oligopoly
contract costs
strategic substitutes
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jansen, Jos
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jansen, Jos
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2000