Arbeitspapier
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive dealership) contract with its retailer. Equilibrium coexistence emerges when observable and non-renegotiable contracts are offered to downstream Cournot oligopolists that supply close substitutes. The scope for equilibrium coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 00-16
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Subject
-
vertical oligopoly
contract costs
strategic substitutes
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Jansen, Jos
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jansen, Jos
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2000
Other Objects (12)
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Strategic Vertical Separation
The strategic value of partial vertical integration
Strategic decisions regarding the vertical integration of financial service providers
Asymmetric vertical integration
Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy
Phase separation and coexistence of hydrodynamically interacting microswimmers
Strategic vertical foreign investment under exchange rate uncertainty
Vertical integration and supplier finance
Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration
Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Strategic Vertical Separation
The strategic value of partial vertical integration
Strategic decisions regarding the vertical integration of financial service providers
Asymmetric vertical integration
Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy
Phase separation and coexistence of hydrodynamically interacting microswimmers
Strategic vertical foreign investment under exchange rate uncertainty
Vertical integration and supplier finance
Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration
Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration
Strategic Vertical Separation
The strategic value of partial vertical integration
Strategic decisions regarding the vertical integration of financial service providers
Asymmetric vertical integration
Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy
Phase separation and coexistence of hydrodynamically interacting microswimmers
Strategic vertical foreign investment under exchange rate uncertainty
Vertical integration and supplier finance
Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration