Arbeitspapier
Cake division by majority decision
We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1872
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Distribution: General
Distribution: Other
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Pachl, Bernhard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Pachl, Bernhard
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006
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