Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs

Arbeitspapier

We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal and taxed and non-taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs where the agenda-setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We also illustrate that higher dimensional uncertainty about project parameters can make it easier to achieve first-best allocations and that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 749

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Publicly Provided Goods: General
• Thema: democratic constitutions ; unobservable utilities ; double majority rules ; flexible agenda cost rules

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76097
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ