Arbeitspapier
Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2834
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
elections
campaign contributions
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Wahlkampffinanzierung
Interessenpolitik
Gleichgewicht
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2009
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