Arbeitspapier
Minority Voting and Public Project Provision
We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2007-20
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Publicly Provided Goods: General
- Thema
-
democratic constitutions
minority voting
public projects
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2007
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