Arbeitspapier

Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

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We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2007-20

Classification
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Subject
democratic constitutions
minority voting
public projects

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gersbach, Hans
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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