Minority voting and long-term decisions

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2198

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: voting ; minority ; durable decision ; risk aversion ; tyranny of majority rules ; Abstimmungsregel ; Minderheit ; Wahlsystem ; Zeitkonsistenz ; Risikoaversion ; Public Choice

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Fahrenberger, Theresa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ