Arbeitspapier

Co-voting Democracy

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society – represented by the randomly-chosen subset – a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/256

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Co-Voting
Representative Democracy
Citizen Participation
Legitimacy of Democracy
Assessment Voting
Wahlverhalten
Partizipation
Legitimität
Demokratie
Neue politische Ökonomie
Entscheidungstheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gersbach, Hans
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010700077
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gersbach, Hans
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Time of origin

  • 2016

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