Arbeitspapier
Co-voting Democracy
We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society – represented by the randomly-chosen subset – a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/256
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Co-Voting
Representative Democracy
Citizen Participation
Legitimacy of Democracy
Assessment Voting
Wahlverhalten
Partizipation
Legitimität
Demokratie
Neue politische Ökonomie
Entscheidungstheorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gersbach, Hans
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2016
- DOI
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doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010700077
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Time of origin
- 2016