Assessment voting in large electorates

Arbeitspapier

We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at hand, thereby irrevocably exercising their right to vote. In the second round, after the results of the first round have been published, the remaining citizens decide whether to vote for one alternative or to abstain. The votes from both rounds are aggregated, and the final outcome is obtained by applying the majority rule, with ties being broken by fair randomization. Within a costly voting framework, we show that large electorates will choose the preferred alternative of the majority with high probability, and that average costs will be low. This result is in contrast with the literature on one-round voting, which predicts either higher voting costs (when voting is compulsory) or decisions that often do not represent the preferences of the majority (when voting is voluntary).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 17/284

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: voting ; referenda ; rational behavior

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Tejada, Oriol
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000221605
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179446
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ