Konferenzbeitrag

Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the necessary parliamentary majority to approve it. In a two-period model, we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers of negative macroeconomic shocks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: The Effect of Constitutional Rules ; No. C17-V1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Thema
fiscal policy
public debt
public goods
voting
simple majority rule
debt-sensitive majority rule
debt restriction

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grimm, Oliver
Becker, Johannes
Gersbach, Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Verein für Socialpolitik
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Grimm, Oliver
  • Becker, Johannes
  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Verein für Socialpolitik

Entstanden

  • 2010

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