Konferenzbeitrag
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the necessary parliamentary majority to approve it. In a two-period model, we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers of negative macroeconomic shocks.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: The Effect of Constitutional Rules ; No. C17-V1
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- Thema
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fiscal policy
public debt
public goods
voting
simple majority rule
debt-sensitive majority rule
debt restriction
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Grimm, Oliver
Becker, Johannes
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
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2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Grimm, Oliver
- Becker, Johannes
- Gersbach, Hans
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010