Arbeitspapier
Flexible Majority Rules
In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban on subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 464
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Flexible majority rules
incomplete social contract
constitutional treatment rules
provision of public projects
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Erlenmaier, Ulrich
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Erlenmaier, Ulrich
- Gersbach, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Flexible majority rules for cryptocurrency issuance
Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs
Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
Cake division by majority decision
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Open rule legislative bargaining
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Banking-on-the-Average Rules
Rules vs. Targets: Climate Treaties under Uncertainty
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Financial Intermediation and the Creation of Macroeconomic Risks
New Forms of Democracy
Flexible majority rules for cryptocurrency issuance
Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs
Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
Cake division by majority decision
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Open rule legislative bargaining
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Banking-on-the-Average Rules
Rules vs. Targets: Climate Treaties under Uncertainty
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Financial Intermediation and the Creation of Macroeconomic Risks
New Forms of Democracy
Flexible majority rules for cryptocurrency issuance
Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs
Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
Cake division by majority decision
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Open rule legislative bargaining
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Banking-on-the-Average Rules
Rules vs. Targets: Climate Treaties under Uncertainty
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Financial Intermediation and the Creation of Macroeconomic Risks