Arbeitspapier
Flexible Majority Rules
In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban on subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 464
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Flexible majority rules
incomplete social contract
constitutional treatment rules
provision of public projects
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Erlenmaier, Ulrich
Gersbach, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Erlenmaier, Ulrich
- Gersbach, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001
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