Arbeitspapier
Legislative Process with Open Rules
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 07/64
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Baron/Ferejohn model
bargaining in legislatures
open rules
threegroup and four-group equilibria
Wahlverhalten
Verhandlungstheorie
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fahrenberger, Theresa
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005381999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fahrenberger, Theresa
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2007
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