Arbeitspapier
Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 32
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
non-cooperative bargaining
stationary equilibrium
replication
Walrasian market
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kultti, Klaus
Vartiainen, Hannu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (wo)
-
Turku
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kultti, Klaus
- Vartiainen, Hannu
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Entstanden
- 2008
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