Arbeitspapier
Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 95.2005
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Strategic bargaining
Non-monolithic players
Scission
Noncooperative game-theory
Verhandlungstheorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pereau, Jean Christophe
Caparrós, Alejandro
Tazdaït, Tarik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pereau, Jean Christophe
- Caparrós, Alejandro
- Tazdaït, Tarik
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2005
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