Arbeitspapier
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random proposers. Only continuous-time Markov processes are firmly rooted in probability theory and offer fundamentally different limit results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-063/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Bargaining
Negotiation
Alternating offers
Markov process
subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash bargaining solution
Maximum Theorem
Verhandlungstheorie
Dynamisches Spiel
Markovscher Prozess
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Houba, Harold
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Houba, Harold
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2005
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