Arbeitspapier
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random proposers. Only continuous-time Markov processes are firmly rooted in probability theory and offer fundamentally different limit results.
- Sprache
- 
                Englisch
 
- Erschienen in
- 
                Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-063/1
 
- Klassifikation
- 
                Wirtschaft
 Noncooperative Games
 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
 
- Thema
- 
                Bargaining
 Negotiation
 Alternating offers
 Markov process
 subgame perfect equilibrium
 Nash bargaining solution
 Maximum Theorem
 Verhandlungstheorie
 Dynamisches Spiel
 Markovscher Prozess
 Nash-Gleichgewicht
 Theorie
 Nichtkooperatives Spiel
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Houba, Harold
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Tinbergen Institute
 
- (wo)
- 
                Amsterdam and Rotterdam
 
- (wann)
- 
                2005
 
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Houba, Harold
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2005
 
            