Arbeitspapier

Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution

A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and the egalitarian solution. The Shapley value is characterized in various ways. Most characterizations use some axiom related to null players, i.e. players who contribute nothing to any coalition. We show that in these characterizations, replacing null players by zero players characterizes the egalitarian solution, where a player is a zero player if every coalition containing this player earns zero worth. We illustrate this difference between these two solutions by applying them to auction games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-127/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Auctions
Thema
Null players
zero players
Shapley value
egalitarian solution
strong monotonicity
coalitional monotonicity
auction games
Spieltheorie
Transferable Utility Games
Kooperatives Spiel
Shapley-Wert
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van den Brink, René
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van den Brink, René
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2004

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