Arbeitspapier
The Bonacich Shapley centrality
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a consequence, the Shapley value belongs to the core, which enhances the attractive features of our new centrality measure. Then, we compute the Shapley value for various examples and illustrate some of its properties.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2106
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
Social networks
network games
peer effects
centrality measures
Bonacich centrality
Shapley value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Allouch, Nizar
Meca, Ana
Polotskaya, K.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Kent, School of Economics
- (wo)
-
Canterbury
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Allouch, Nizar
- Meca, Ana
- Polotskaya, K.
- University of Kent, School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2021
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