Arbeitspapier
Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 32
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
-
non-cooperative bargaining
stationary equilibrium
replication
Walrasian market
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kultti, Klaus
Vartiainen, Hannu
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
-
Turku
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kultti, Klaus
- Vartiainen, Hannu
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2008
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