Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems

Arbeitspapier

We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed. This limit is close to the Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the dead line goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. The limit outcome is given an axiomatic characterization as well.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion paper ; No. 51

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Thema: Nash solution ; Raiffa solution ; bargaining

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Imai, Haruo ; Salonen, Hannu
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
• (wo): Turku
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233267
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ